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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JODY G. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
vs. 
EVERETT D. ROBINSON, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
Case No. 20090007-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103 
(2) (h) because it is an appeal from a district court domestic relations case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The burden is on the Appellant in this action to show that the trial court 
committed reversible error. The Respondent alleges that the trial court erred in 
many ways but fails to demonstrate reversible error in any of his arguments. This 
Court should affirm the lower court's ruling on that ground and also because the 
Respondent failed to file a timely objection in the lower court to the 
Commissioner's recommendation. Such a failure constitutes an affirmative waiver 
of his right to object to the recommendation on appeal. The Respondent also failed 
to properly preserve the issues for appeal in the lower court. 
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Additionally, the Respondent objects in his brief to the factual findings of 
the trial court. As laid forth below, this Court should not disturb the trial court's 
factual findings because the Respondent did not marshal evidence for an against 
the trial court's factual findings. The Respondent alleges that the issuance of the 
final protective order was in error on many different grounds; however, all of 
those arguments are flawed. Furthermore, the trial court granted the protective 
order on many bases, any one of which would be independently sufficient to 
justify entry of the final protective order. For the foregoing reasons and for the 
reasons stated below, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION AND BECAUSE HE 
DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
A. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY OBJECTION 
TO THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Section 7 (g) provides as follows: 
Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A 
recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court 
until modified by the court. A party may object to the 
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing 
a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open 
court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under 
advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is 
served. 
In regard to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the Utah State Legislature has said, 
"If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or 
2 
respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended 
order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the 
objection." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.3 (2009). 
If the Respondent fails to object within ten days to a Commissioner's 
recommendation, a Judge enters a final judgment in the matter in accordance with 
the Commissioner's recommendation. Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28, Tf 12, 
177P.3d648. 
The Respondent concedes that he did not file an objection within ten days 
to the Commissioner's recommendation. (Appellate Br. at 25.) In an unpublished 
2005 decision, this Court ruled that where an Appellant failed to object to a 
Commissioner's recommendation, this failure "may have operated as an 
affirmative waiver of his defenses to [the Petitioner's] motion." Thomas v. 
Thomas, 2004 UT App 240, Fn 1, (unpublished). Based on the Respondent's 
failure to file a timely objection, this Court should not consider his appeal to the 
issuance of the underlying protective order. 
The Respondent did file an objection to the protective order, though not an 
objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, with the trial court on January 
8, 2009 (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M) on the day after his Notice of Appeal was 
filed with this Court. Because this was not a timely-filed objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation but rather a generalized objection to the format 
of the final protective order and other grievances, this does not satisfy the statutory 
requirement that the Respondent file his objection within ten days or that the 
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issues for appeal must be specifically raised. 
B. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THE 
ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
In a recent case, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that '"To preserve an 
issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court/' 
because "a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue."' Odea v. 
Plea, 2009 UT 46, ^ 18, citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 
(Utah 1998). In order to properly preserve an issue at the district court, the 
following must take place, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority. Badger, 966 P.2d at 847.The Respondent 
failed to preserve issues for appeal by failing to file a timely objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendations. Additionally, he didn't object with specificity 
to the Commissioner's recommendation that a permanent protective order enter. 
His January 8, 2009 objection is to the format of the final protective order and the 
Commissioner's authority to adjudicate protective order proceedings, not to the 
Commissioner's recommendation that the Petitioner is entitled to a permanent 
order. (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M.) The Respondent did not wait for the trial 
court to rule on this objection before filing his Notice of Appeal. Applying the 
Badger test above, the Respondent failed to properly preserve the issues for 
appeal. IdL 
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II. THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
The Respondent alleges that his due process rights under the United States 
Constitution and/or the Utah State Constitution were violated in at least three 
different ways as described under his headings A (1) (a)-(c). (Appellant's Br. at 
22-28): (1) The Respondent alleges that he did not receive a copy of the proposed 
final protective order prior to its signing and that it was broader than the 
Commissioner's bench recommendation; (2) The Respondent alleges that the 
Commissioner lacked authority to issue the protective order; and (3) the protective 
order process violated Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(l) (a) thus violating his 
right to due process under the law. 
In each section, the Respondent alleges that his due process rights were 
violated but does not cite the United States Constitution or other statutory or case 
authority, nor does he explain how his due process rights were violated. 
An Appellant alleging a due process violation has the obligation to state the 
"contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented . . . , with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a) (9); Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, % 11,191 P.3d 1242. This 
Court has also stated, "While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always 
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of the 
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). In this case, the Court 
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cannot properly analyze the alleged due process violations because they were not 
adequately briefed by the Respondent. 
The Respondent seems to argue in his Appellant Brief sections A (1) (a)-(b) 
that the Court committed reversible error separate from the alleged due process 
violations; therefore, those two arguments are addressed more specifically below. 
A. A FAILURE TO MAIL THE PROPOSED FINAL PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OUT FOR OBJECTION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In his Appellant's brief, the Respondent objected to the entry of the 
December 19, 2008 Protective Order, stating that he was denied due process by 
the trial court because he was given no opportunity to review and object to the 
Protective Order before it was signed by the Judge. (Appellant's Br. at 22.) The 
Respondent alleges that he should have been served with a copy of the proposed 
order prior to its submission to the court. He further alleges that reversible error 
was committed because the final Protective Order allegedly included seven 
provisions not ordered by Commissioner Patton at the November 7, 2008 hearing 
date. 
The Respondent failed to cite legal authority showing that a failure to send 
a proposed Order out of objections pursuant to Rule 7 (f) (2) of the Utah Rules of 
Procedure is reversible error. This Court has stated: 
[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with 
the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable us to understand ... 
what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record 
those errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, 
those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief. 
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State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 13, 52 P.3d 467. Even if the Court considers 
the facts in the light most favorable to the Respondent and assumes he did not 
receive a copy of the proposed order before it was signed, he has failed to show 
that this is reversible error, and this Court should affirm the lower court's ruling. 
The Respondent also alleges that the final protective order contained seven 
"enlargements or discrepancies" that favored the Petitioner. (Appellant's Br. at 
23.) The Petitioner disagrees that there were enlargements or significant 
discrepancies between the Commissioner's November 17, 2008 bench ruling and 
the final protective order. Any discrepancy that exists between the two is so minor 
as to render it "harmless error," which as defined by this Court "is an error that is 
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Spillars, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24, 152 P.3d 
315. 
B. THE ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
SECTION 6-304. 
The Respondent alleges that in issuing a final protective order after a 
hearing on November 17, 2008, Commissioner Patton exceeded the authority 
delegated to domestic commissioners by Rule 6-401 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. (Appellant's Br. at 25.) The Respondent states, " . . . there is 
nothing on the record to show that someone other than Commissioner Patton made 
the final adjudication of the Second Protective Order, which would be required if 
7 
the District Court were to comply with UJCRJA 6-401 (4) (a)." (Id) 
In Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT 28,177 P.3d 648, this Court found that a 
district court Commissioner may constitutionally take evidence, make proposed 
findings, and issue a recommendation to be acted upon by a Judge in a protective 
order proceeding. Id. at *f 12. Such functions "do not include nondelegable core 
judicial functions." Id The Respondent concedes that Judge Taylor signed the 
November 17, 2008 minute entry in which the Commissioner found that the 
Petitioner was entitled to a permanent protective order. The Respondent also notes 
that the final protective order was signed by both Commissioner Patton and Judge 
Laycock. (Appellant's Br. at 25.) The Court followed proper procedure by having 
district court Judges make a final adjudication of the protective order. This Court 
should affirm the lower court's ruling. 
The Respondent also argues that Commissioner Patton had an obligation to 
inform him that the Commissioner's order was a "recommendation" and that by 
not doing so, the Commissioner failed to give the Respondent proper notice so that 
he could object within ten days. (Appellant's Br. at 26.) 
The Commissioner does not have an affirmative duty to inform the 
Respondent of procedural matters of which the Respondent should already have 
been aware. No such requirement exists in the statute and the Respondent cites no 
authority in support of this contention. 
"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held to the same 
standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson 
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v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). Despite this, courts are generally 
lenient with pro se litigants "because of their lack of technical knowledge of law 
and procedure." Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, Tf 3, 67 P. 3d 1000. In an 
unpublished decision where a former attorney appealed his criminal conviction , 
the Utah Court of Appeals found that even affording that leniency, the Appellant's 
issues on appeal were inadequately briefed, and stated, "We do note that 
Defendant is not in the same position as most pro se litigants in that, as a disbarred 
attorney, he is law trained." State v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354, Fn 1, 
(unpublished). 
Similarly, the Respondent in this case is a recent law school graduate, has 
passed the Utah State Bar Examination, and could reasonably be expected to 
acquaint himself with the applicable rules and statues when appearing pro se. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DISREGARD THE RESPONDENT'S 
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Rule 24 (a) (5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the 
Appellant to provide "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for 
each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." This Court 
may disregard or strike briefs that do not comply with Rule 24. Utah Rules of 
App. Proc. §24 (k) (2009). 
In his listing of nine issues for appeal in pages 6-12 of his Appellant's 
Brief, the Respondent does not question the validity of the issuance of the 
underlying protective order, except by implication in issue number five where he 
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questions whether the entry of a plea in abeyance in a criminal domestic violence 
case can "constitute grounds that domestic violence has occurred." (Appellant's 
Br. at 9.) Because the Respondent did not include the issue of whether the issuance 
of the underlying protective order was valid, he did not indicate to the Court where 
he may have preserved that issue for appeal. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appealing party's 
brief provide either, "(A) [a] citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (5) (A)-(B); Odea v. 
Oley, 2009 UT 46, 53. In challenging the validity of the issuance of the final 
protective order, the Respondent neither cited to the record showing where the 
issue was preserved nor did he state other grounds for review. Due to the 
Respondent's non-compliance with Rule 24, the Petitioner motions this Court to 
disregard his Argument Section A (2) entitled "The grounds for the Protective 
Order are insufficient" except for Section A (2) (a) "plea in abeyance," which was 
properly included in the issues section of the brief in compliance with Rule 24 (a) 
(5). 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY CONSIDERING THE 
RESPONDENT'S ENTRY OF A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN A 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE. 
At the protective order hearing on November 17, 2008, the Commissioner 
stated: 
When I review the file, what does not seem to be disputed is that Mr. 
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Robinson has entered a plea in abeyance on a criminal charge of 
domestic violence. That does not seem to be disputed. That in and of 
itself would be sufficient for the entry of a protective order. 
However, the Court is not relying only on that. 
(Appellant's Addendum, Ex. J at 3). 
The trial court did not err by relying upon the Respondent's entry of a plea 
in abeyance as one of the grounds for entering a permanent protective order on 
November 17, 2008. But even if the trial court had erred in considering the 
Respondent's entry of a plea in abeyance to his domestic violence charges, this 
Court should still uphold the entry of the permanent protective order because it 
was entered upon multiple grounds, any of which would have independently 
justified the entry of a permanent protective order. 
The trial court did not err by considering the Respondent's entry of a plea 
in abeyance on the criminal charges the resulted from one of the major incidents 
upon which the request for protective order was based. The Respondent attempted 
to cite Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to Support the contention that a 
plea of "nolo contendere" cannot be admitted as evidence against the defendant 
making the plea. (Appellant's Br. at 30.) 
According to the Appellant's Addendum, the Respondent entered pleas of 
"no contest- plea in abeyance" to the charges of assault and three charges of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. (Ex. K at 9.) A plea of "no contest— 
plea in abeyance" is not the same as a plea of "nolo contendere." The former plea 
can be properly considered by the Court. 
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In the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act found in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 76-36-1.1 (3) (2009), the statute says in regard to enhancement of criminal 
charges due to previous convictions of domestic violence charges: 
For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to any 
qualifying domestic offense in Utah which plea is held in abeyance 
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a 
conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or 
dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
According to the state legislature, in a closely analogous context, a plea in 
abeyance, even if it is coupled with a plea of "nolo contendere," is the equivalent 
as a conviction for other purposes under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
The same reasoning should apply to the entry of a protective order based on a plea 
in abeyance. For those two reasons, the Commissioner properly considered the 
Respondent's plea in his criminal case. 
B. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE TO 
PROPERLY CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL 
FINDINGS. 
The trial court entered the permanent protective order on November 17, 
2008 based partially on its finding that the Respondent had violated the Modified 
Ex-Parte Protective Order, agreed to by the parties on May 13, 2008. The 
Respondent disputes the Commissioner's finding that he had violated the Ex-Parte 
Order. (Appellant's Br. at 31-34.) 
The Respondent disagrees with the trial court's interpretation of the 
Modified Ex-Parte Protective Order and its findings that he had violated the Order. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "A court's interpretation of its own order is 
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reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great 
deference." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15,1f 9, 179 P.3d 
786. 
The trial court made detailed and well-reasoned findings in support of its 
finding that the Respondent had violated the Modified Ex Parte Protective Order: 
Let me go back and state I also note that she has also indicated that 
he has violated the temporary protective order from the earlier case 
by moving back into the home and refusing to leave her and the 
children alone while in the home . . . I am also looking at paragraph 
3, property orders. It is clear and unmistakable that it says that 
Petitioner, the Petitioner is Jody Robinson, is awarded use, control 
and possession of the Parties' home . . .The Respondent shall not 
interfere with Petitioner's use of said property but is not prohibited 
from non-interfering use. Which is what he has pointed out. But he 
cannot interfere with her use, control and possession. That's what he 
cannot interfere with because that's what she was granted. And it 
goes on: the intent of this provision is to allow the respondent to 
continue to care for the Parties' property, participate in family events 
at the home, and other circumstances as mutually agreed upon by the 
parties. Which is also clear that if there is not mutual agreement, he 
has no authority to interfere with her control, use or possession. It 
would be his burden to convince the court that she was in mutual 
agreement. It is readily apparent that she was not, on many 
occasions. 
(Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M at 3.) 
In his Appellant's brief, the Respondent restates the arguments he made 
before the trial court as to his interpretation of the Modified Ex-Parte Protective 
Order. He does not offer any authority to support his position. He does not marshal 
evidence to dispute the trial court's finding that he violated the ex-parte order. "In 
order to successfully challenge factual findings such as these, an appellant must 
first marshal all of the evidence that supports the findings and then demonstrate 
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that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the district court, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding." Matter of Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 
1350 (Utah 1994). If a Respondent fails to marshal evidence, the appellate courts 
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact. Id, 
The Respondent's challenges to the trial court's findings throughout his 
brief are flawed by a failure to marshal evidence, including the section of the 
Appellant's brief in which the Respondent attempts to challenge the trial court's 
finding that he placed his wife in fear of imminent harm. Because the Respondent 
made no attempt to marshal facts but merely restated his arguments before the trial 
court, this Court should not consider his challenges to the trial court's factual 
findings. 
IV. THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER IS NOT OVERBROAD. 
The Respondent's third major argument seems to be that the final 
protective order was overbroad. He alleges that the final protective order violated 
Utah Code Annotated Section 62A-4a-201 (1) (b), which the Respondent stated 
bars the judiciary from "protecting the wife and children" with anything beyond 
the least restrictive means or alternatives available. (Appellant's Br. at 43.) The 
Respondent's arguments are based on a misreading of the statute cited above and 
the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Further, the Respondent reargues the same facts he 
argued before the trial court. He spends a great deal of time trying to prove that the 
Petitioner does not need protection from him. Despite this, he does not marshal 
evidence nor properly present argument that the trial court's factual findings were 
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erroneous. Once again, a failure to marshal means the Court will not disturb the 
trial court's factual findings. Id 
In State v. Hardy, an appellant attempted to challenge the protective order 
statute, alleging that it was unconstitutionally overbroad because the statute 
prohibited even "innocent speech" between the parties. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, 
Tf 16, 53 P.3d 645. In its decision, the Court emphasized the state's significant 
interest in protecting "the health and well-being of its citizens" and that the 
issuance of a protective order is necessary in certain cases to protect that interest. 
IdL at f 17. The Court explained that the protective order statute is not overbroad: 
Although subsection 30-6-4.2(2) (b) appears to sweep broadly 
because it allows courts to prohibit all communication between two 
people, the statute is actually quite narrowly crafted. Before a 
protective order may issue, a court must first conclude that the 
parties to the protective order are cohabitants, and that a cohabitant 
has been "subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or ... there is a 
substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic 
violence." Id. Without the particular relationship of "cohabitants" 
and without previous instances or the "substantial likelihood" of 
domestic violence or abuse, the court may not restrict the protective 
order respondent's right to speak and associate freely. Id. Thus, we 
conclude that section 30-6-4.2 is not impermissibly overbroad 
because it is narrowly drafted to "burden no more speech than 
necessary to serve a significant government interest." Madsen, 512 
U.S. at 765, 114 S.Ct. at 2525. Consequently, we also conclude that 
section 76-5-108, which provides criminal penalties for violating a 
protective order, is also not overly broad. 
Id 
Similar reasoning applies to this case; the protective order statute has been 
narrowly drafted to provide safety to the protected persons. The Respondent is 
restrained from attempting or committing abuse against any of the protected 
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persons and from contacting the Petitioner. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-106 (2) (a)-
(b). The Respondent is not restrained from contacting his children or from 
exercising parent-time with the children. The portion of the permanent protective 
order that issues orders pertaining to child custody and parent-time expires in a 
maximum of 150 days from issuance or upon further order of the court. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-7-107 (6) (a) (2009). This is to ensure that the Respondent's parental 
rights are properly adjudicated in the correct family law action rather than in a 
protective order. The protective order statute is not overbroad, nor does it violate 
Utah Code Annotated Section 62A-4a-201 (1) (b). 
V. THE RESPONDENT CANNOT OBTAIN A PROTECTIVE ORDER 
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN THIS ACTION, 
The Respondent also attempts to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
Request for Protective Order, filed pro se by the Respondent under the Petitioner's 
Protective Order case numbers. The Respondent never filed his own, separate 
request for protective order under a separate case number. He filed under his 
wife's two protective order case numbers. (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. G at 1.) 
Utah Code Annotated section 78B-7-108 (2009) requires: (1) A court may not 
grant a mutual order or mutual orders for protection to opposing parties, unless 
each party: (a) has filed an independent petition against the other for a protective 
order, and both petitions have been served.. ." 
Because the Respondent filed his petition for protective order in the wrong 
case, the trial court did not issue a temporary protective ordered and, accordingly, 
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the Petition was never served with a temporary protective order. The Respondent 
is clearly not entitled to a protective order to issue under the Petitioner's protective 
order case numbers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court affirm the lower court's 
entry of a final protective order. The Respondent's brief failed to show that the 
lower court committed reversible error at any point in its adjudication. Further, the 
Respondent failed to properly object to the Commissioner's recommendation in 
the lower court and to preserve the issues for appeal before this Court. He failed to 
marshal evidence in his attempts to challenge the lower court's factual findings, 
and those factual findings should not be disturbed. The Commissioner's 
recommendation that the Petitioner was entitled to a protective order in the court 
below was well-reasoned and supported by substantial evidence and findings of 
fact. This Court should affirm the lower court's ruling. 
DATED, this ^ day of ^ep^mheT, 2009. 
*IS)rteiW»,k'flJtftiortr 
Patricia K. Abbott 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this ;y>> day of ^mkmber , 2009,1 served a copy of 
the attached Appellee's Brief upon Everett D. Robinson, Respondent/Appellant, 
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the 
following address: 
Everett D. Robinson 
Respondent/Appellant 
P.O. Box 1047 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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